Evaluating the impact on health outcomes of an event that resulted in a delay in contact tracing of COVID-19 cases (preprint)

Objective In September 2020, records of 15,861 SARS-CoV-2 cases failed to upload from the Second Generation Laboratory Surveillance System (SGSS) to the Contact Tracing Advisory Service (CTAS) tool, resulting in a delay in the contact tracing of these cases. This study used CTAS data to determine the impact of this delay on health outcomes: transmission events, hospitalisations, and mortality. Previously, a modelling study had suggested a substantial impact. Design Observational study Setting England. Population Individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 and their reported contacts. Main outcome measures Secondary attack rates (SARs), hospitalisations, and deaths amongst primary and secondary contacts were calculated, compared to all other concurrent, unaffected cases. SGSS records affected by the event were matched to CTAS records and successive contacts and cases were identified. Results The initiation of contact tracing was delayed by 3 days on average in the primary cases in the delay group (6 days) compared to the control group (3 days). This was associated with lower completion of contact tracing of primary cases in the delay group: 80% (95%CI: 79-81%) in the delay group and 83% (95%CI: 83-84%) in the control group. There was some evidence to suggest an increase in transmission to non-household contacts amongst those affected by the delay. The SAR for non-household contacts was higher amongst secondary contacts in the delay group than the control group (delay group: 7.9%, 95%CI:6.4% to 9.2%; control group: 5.9%, 95%CI: 5.3% to 6.6%). There was no evidence of a difference between the delay and control groups in the odds of hospitalisation (crude odds ratio: 1.1 (95%CI: 0.9 to 1.2) or death (crude odds ratio: 0.7 (0.1 to 4.0)) amongst secondary contacts. Conclusions The delay in contact tracing had a limited impact on population health outcomes. Strengths and limitations of the study Shows empirical data on the health impact of an event leading to a delay in contact tracing so can test hypotheses generated by models of the potential impact of a delay in contact tracing Estimates the extent of further transmission and odds of increased mortality or hospitalisation in up to the third generation of cases affected by the event The event acts as a natural experiment to describe the possible impact of contact tracing, comparing a group affected by chance by delayed contact tracing to a control group who experienced no delay Contact tracing was not completed for all individuals, so the study might not capture all affected contacts or transmissions

High COVID-19 transmission potential associated with re-opening universities can be mitigated with layered interventions (preprint)

Background: Re-opening universities while controlling COVID-19 transmission poses unique challenges. UK universities typically host 20,000 to 40,000 undergraduate students, with the majority moving away from home to attend. In the absence of realistic mixing patterns, previous models suggest that outbreaks associated with universities re-opening are an eventuality. Methods: We developed a stochastic transmission model based on realistic mixing patterns between students. We evaluated alternative mitigation interventions for a representative university. Results: Our model predicts, for a set of plausible parameter values, that if asymptomatic cases are half as infectious as symptomatic cases then 5,760 (3,940 - 7,430) out of 28,000 students, 20% (14% - 26%), could be infected during the first term, with 950 (656 - 1,209) cases infectious on the last day of term. If asymptomatic cases are as infectious as symptomatic cases then three times as many cases could occur, with 94% (93% - 94%) of the student population getting infected during the first term. We predict that one third of infected students are likely to be in their first year, and first year students are the main drivers of transmission due to high numbers of contacts in communal residences. We find that reducing face-to-face teaching is likely to be the single most effective intervention, and this conclusion is robust to varying assumptions about asymptomatic transmission. Supplementing reduced face-to-face testing with COVID-secure interactions and reduced living circles could reduce the percentage of infected students by 75%. Mass testing of students would need to occur at least fortnightly, is not the most effective option considered, and comes at a cost of high numbers of students requiring self-isolation. When transmission is controlled in the student population, limiting imported infection from the community is important. Conclusions: Priority should be given to understanding the role of asymptomatic transmission in the spread of COVID-19. Irrespective of assumptions about asymptomatic transmission, our findings suggest that additional outbreak control measures should be considered for the university setting. These might include reduced face-to-face teaching, management of student mixing and enhanced testing. Onward transmission to family members at the end of term is likely without interventions.

Identifying zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV-2 by modeling the binding affinity between Spike receptor-binding domain and host ACE2 (preprint)

Despite considerable research progress on SARS-CoV-2, the direct zoonotic origin (intermediate host) of the virus remains ambiguous. The most definitive approach to identify the intermediate host would be the detection of SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses in wild animals. However, due to the high number of animal species, it is not feasible to screen all the species in the laboratory. Given that the recognition of the binding ACE2 proteins is the first step for the coronaviruses to invade host cells, we proposed a computational pipeline to identify potential intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 by modeling the binding affinity between the Spike receptor-binding domain (RBD) and host ACE2. Using this pipeline, we systematically examined 285 ACE2 variants from mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and amphibians, and found that the binding energies calculated on the modeled Spike-RBD/ACE2 complex structures correlate closely with the effectiveness of animal infections as determined by multiple experimental datasets. Built on the optimized binding affinity cutoff, we suggested a set of 96 mammals, including 48 experimentally investigated ones, which are permissive to SARS-CoV-2, with candidates from primates, rodents, and carnivores at the highest risk of infection. Overall, this work not only suggested a limited range of potential intermediate SARS-CoV-2 hosts for further experimental investigation; but more importantly, it proposed a new structure-based approach to general zoonotic origin and susceptibility analyses that are critical for human infectious disease control and wildlife protection.